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Since Turkey’s coup attempt in July 2016, human rights violations have been abundant.
170,599 people have been dismissed from their jobs, and thousands of educational
facilities and hundreds of NGOs and media outlets shut down. 140,452 people have been
detained in appalling conditions on ‘terrorist’ charges, and 79,774 arrested. Those
persecuted include journalists, human rights defenders, civil servants, judges and
prosecutors. With a broken Turkish justice system, the ECtHR has received over 33,000
applications from the country, with 30 to 40 more incoming each week. Shockingly, more
than 90% of these applications have been dismissed. This is often on dubious grounds,
causing experts and Turkish citizens alike to condemn its response.
On the 25  May, Spokesperson of the CoE Secretary General Daniel Holtgen declared that
such criticism is “ill-informed and counterproductive”. Backlash rightly ensued. By the 13
of June, Holtgen and the CoE Director General for Human Rights Christos
Giakoumopoulos met with the Turkish Media and Law Studies Association (MLSA) Director
Evin Altıntaş and General Coordinator Veysel Ok to discuss the situation. Both the CoE and
MLSA subsequently released statements. As someone who has previously written about
the inadequacies of the ECtHR vis a vis Turkey, I review these criticisms, statements, and
what should be done next.
Criticisms
The most vital and highly criticised post-coup decision taken by the ECtHR is the Köksal v.
Turkey decision. Teacher Gökhan Köksal was dismissed from his job; dismissals have
accounted for over 90% of ECtHR applications. Köksal’s case was rejected on the basis
that he must first apply to the Turkish State of Emergency Commission, i.e., exhaust all
domestic avenues. This Commission was formed in January 2017 – notably via CoE
recommendation – for appeals against dismissals and closures. Despite being ruled a
viable domestic avenue, it is inefficient and non-impartial. Out of 21,500 cases finalised, the
Commission has only approved 1,300. This is a minuscule 6% success rate. And then there
is 85,500 cases still under examination. Yet Köksal v. Turkey set a precedent for countless
of further ECtHR applications to be rejected. Some, like in the case of Feza Publications,
were rejected on this ground despite the applicants not being entitled to apply to the
Commission.
Aside from applications rejected in reference to Köksal v. Turkey, there are other instances
of the ECtHR failing to provide justice for post-coup victims. Ayhan Bora, a judge who was
arrested and kept in pre-trial solitary confinement without justification, applied under Article
3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This prohibits torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment, which can include solitary confinement based on factors like severity,
duration and purpose. Despite Bora’s treatment being severe, lengthy, aimless, and illegal
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under Turkish domestic law – which stipulates only those sentenced for being a member of
a terrorist organisation and posing concrete danger can be kept in solitary confinement –
the ECtHR decided that Article 3 had not been violated. The ill-treatment continued until
Bora was acquitted in early 2018 due to lack of evidence.
The Bora v. Turkey decision is simply one of many disappointing rulings which have
signalled to Turkish authorities that violating human rights goes unpunished.  Moreover, it
has been noted by the likes of politicians, lawyers, academics and human rights defenders
such as from Human Rights Watch that the ECtHR acts selectively. In April this year the
ECtHR ruled in favour of journalist Şahin Alpay; a win for Turkish victims, but nonetheless,
fellow journalists in similar situations but who could not garner international attention have
had their applications rejected. And HDP politician Selahattin Demirtas, held in pre-trial
detention, applied to the ECtHR before Alpay but has not yet received a ruling. This is
notwithstanding that both journalists and parliamentarians are to be given priority
processing. This is even more ridiculous considering Demirtas was a presidential candidate
in the recent June election and had to campaign from his cell.
On another note in respect to the Alpay decision; it ruled the Turkish Constitutional Court as
a viable domestic avenue. Granted that the State of Emergency Commission is a larger
concern, people have pointed to the fact that even the traditional judicial system should not
be considered effective. Since the coup-attempt, 4,463 judges and prosecutors have been
dismissed. Many have been detained, including two Constitutional Court judges. The
judicial system is, undoubtedly, no longer impartial or independent. Successful rulings are
not even abided by. In the case of Alpay, the Constitutional Court ruled for his release in
January, but lower assize courts refused. Just days before the ECtHR decision, the
Constitutional Court again ruled for his release. This time the lower courts complied, paving
the way for the ECtHR to see it as effective.
CoE Response
Daniel Holtgen’s response to these criticisms was highly controversial. Despite being
evidence-based and coming from countless people, he called them “ill-informed and
counterproductive”. He added that “the EC[t]HR will not be pressurised by anyone”. After
he was castigated for this, Holtgen promised further explanation. Three weeks later, he met
with the MLSA representatives.
The CoE then released a statement, saying it “is aware of a common perception among
NGOs that the ECtHR is not giving adequate attention to human rights issues in Turkey,
but believes this is based on a lack of information and misconceptions”. The majority of the
statement then goes on to reiterate that they reserve the right to reject applications which
have yet to exhaust domestic avenues, i.e. the State of Emergency Commission and the
Turkish Constitutional Court. This is despite simultaneously noting the extent of judges
detained, and that the Constitutional Court has dismissed 5,000 detention cases of civil
servants and magistrates and 75,000 out of 80,000 cases overall. The role of the courts is
further important as rulings by the Commission are subject to judicial review. Essentially, it
can take a decade or more to exhaust domestic avenues which have thus far proved to be
non-impartial and inefficient.
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In addition, the CoE statement references Şahin Alpay’s case; “the decisions of the assize
courts raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of the remedy”. Why then is the
judicial system still considered viable? The positive aspect is it does say that the status of
being a viable domestic avenue can be reviewed in the future. Nonetheless, there are
important questions as to how and when this could occur. It also appears encouraging that
the ECtHR is focusing on applicants subjected to pre-trial detention; yet the representatives
do not address the criticism that such applicants are waiting for impossible amounts of time
before seeing justice from the ECtHR.
MLSA Response
The MLSA too put forward a statement following the meeting. They comment on pre-trial
detainees’ applications: “The ECtHR had taken approximately 18 months to review and
finally issue a ruling in the cases of two journalists whose applications had been granted
priority; a duration too lengthy at a time when Turkish courts are rapidly handing out
sentences. [In one example,] The court issued a ruling finding the detention of Altan
unlawful, but it came after he was given a life sentence for attempting to overthrow the
constitutional order. It was too late.” Altan’s ECtHR ruling came at the same time as
Alpay’s, similarly after the Constitutional Court ruled his pre-trial detention unlawful. But
having been sentenced before the ECtHR verdict, he was not released until months later,
after this meeting took place. His conviction is still subject to appeal.
The MLSA representatives also bought up the issue of viable domestic avenues. Their
statement provides more substantial insight into CoE views on the State of Emergency
Commission. Director General Giakoumopoulos justified the Commission in terms of the
right to access legal review, saying that any ECtHR ruling would have only set up a similar
remedy. He also said that the ECtHR cannot rule on dismissals because access to jobs is
not a fundamental human right. However, aside from the Commission hardly being viable
legal review, the loss of a job is not the end of the line for these applicants. Dismissal leads
to further persecution, such as passports cancelled, children removed, discrimination in all
sectors of society, and even used as evidence for detention. With media workers, a
dismissal gives way to a violation of freedom of expression. In respect to the Constitutional
Court, the MLSA observed similar reasoning to what I have stated, concluding that it is
hard to understand how it can still be considered an effective remedy. In fact, the
representatives stated that they agree with much of the criticism towards the ECtHR.
What Now?
Overall, the meeting is cause for optimism in light of CoE representatives consulting NGO
members who have been involved in Turkish applications to the ECtHR and are well-
versed on its failures. The statements do provide some insight, but leave plenty to be
addressed. In moving forward, the CoE must reconsider the criteria of a viable domestic
avenue; at the very least, explain the circumstances in which the State of Emergency
Commission and Constitutional Court could be reevaluated. Addressing concerns over
individual cases would also serve them well. For instance, the Feza rejection, the Bora
decision, and why Selahattin Demirtas’ application has yet to be ruled on.
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Further communication is of the utmost importance. Many people wish to see an open
event to discuss the CoE’s position. As Turkish human rights violations continue on a
massive scale, with no sign of stopping now that Erdogan has been re-elected, there is no
doubt that the ECtHR will continue to receive both applications and criticism. It should be
noted that with the influx of Turkish applications post-coup – which as the CoE notes, is
unprecedented – the process must be streamlined. Nonetheless, each application
represents a human life, and gross human rights violations that must be treated
accordingly. Despite the necessity of remaining neutral in political situations, such a blatant
crackdown needs to be confronted by the ECtHR. Otherwise, it risks that very criticism of
acting politically, but in favour of the offending government.
As the MLSA points out, “The ECtHR is being discussed publicly to an extent that has
never happened until now. This involves a particular danger. Although we understand the
court’s adamance on protecting its credibility before the Turkish state, we also think it is
more important that the court maintains its reputation in the eyes of civil society and the
peoples of Turkey”.
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